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Abstract:  Drawing  on  a  unique  set  of  surveys,  this  article  explores  the  question  of  whether 
Russia’s post-communist business associations are generally antithetical to or supportive of the 
broad objectives of economic restructuring. Contrary to the most widely cited analysis as to the 
purposes of collective action in the business community, the survey evidence demonstrates that 
association  members  have  embraced  market-adapting  behaviors  at  greater  rates  than  non-
members.  The responses of both firms and associations, moreover, suggest that the associations 
themselves may, at least in part, be directly responsible.  These findings point to the conclusion 
that in contemporary Russia the net returns to collective action in support of market development 
are high relative to those for purposes that are less benign. 
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1 My research has received generous support from the National Council for Eurasian and East European 
Research,  the  International  Research  and  Exchanges  Board,  the  William  Davidson  Institute, Middlebury 
College and the Fulbright-Hays Fellowship program.   1 
Since  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  formal  introduction  of  markets,  a 
significant percentage of Russian firms have helped form and/or joined business associations. 
Our  estimates  suggest  that  more  than  one-third  of  Russia’s  manufacturing  firms  are  now 
members  of  at  least  one  of  these  voluntarily  comprised,  non-commercial  organizations;  a 
substantial share of non-members benefit from some of their services as well. And even though 
indications are that their economic influence has grown of late, relatively little has been written 
about them and how their activities affect the Russian economy.   
Given that they operate at the interface of the state and the private business sector – well-
covered territory in both the social science literature and popular press – this may seem a bit 
surprising.   Certainly, some attention has been given to a small number of politically prominent 
associations and the waxing and waning of their influence at the highest levels of government. 
But  generally  not  a  great  deal  is  known,  in  any  comprehensive  sense,  about  the  organized 
business community’s activity, particularly below the federal level.
2 In particular, little is known 
about the types of firms that join and the nature of the services that they receive. Are the aims of 
associations and their members generally antithetical to or supportive of the broad objectives of 
economic restructuring?  
The answer here engages a larger question about the post-communist development of 
market supporting institutions. While much attention has been focused on why they may or may 
not have been fully or consistently promoted by public policy, less has been given to collective 
responses  at the  grassroots level.
3  If, indeed, market-supporting institutions are valuable and 
Russia began its transition poorly endowed, it is not un-natural to expect that private actors may 
have organized for their provision. On the other hand, if markets pose a survival threat to some 
enterprises or, at the most, offer them only limited opportunities, it would not be surprising to 
find  that  some  organizations  have  grown  up  to  frustrate  their  development  or  modify  their 
outcomes. Given the evidence available to date, it has not been possible to determine which story  
                                                           
2 Of course, a great deal has been written about the motivation and impact of the oligarchs (Guriev and 
Rachinsky, 2005; Hellman, 1998; Hoffman, 2002), an ill-defined class of wealthy business people, who have 
periodically, but not consistently, cooperated in the pursuit of shared interests. We do not consider them here 
since our focus is on formal organizations for collective action in the business community. We should note, 
however, that many of those that have been identified as leading oligarchs in today’s Russia have become 
prominent patrons of leading business associations.    
3  A  particularly  noteworthy  exception  is  Frye’s  study  (2000)  of  self-governing  organizations  in  Russia’s 
nascent commodity, currency and stock markets.   2 
better characterizes formalized collective action in Russia’s business community. This article, 
however, presents recently collected survey data that allows us to draw this distinction. The 
conclusion,  we  feel,  carries  important  implications  for  development  policy,  which  may  be 
confronted by questions of whether to inhibit or facilitate the organization of business interests. 
Business Associations: Two Views 
We  can  partly  attribute  the  prior  inattention  to  Russian  business  associations  to  the 
absence  of  official  data  on  their  numbers,  membership  rolls  and  activities.  This  lack  of 
information, needless to say, has made their collective purpose less than clear. But our relative 
ignorance may also have resulted, somewhat counter-intuitively, from their objectives seeming 
to be all too transparent. The apparent perception among many, at least, has been that these 
organizations effectively serve as vehicles for promoting narrow, rent-seeking interests. This 
preconception is not all that surprising. After all, the notion that the parochialism of business 
organizations  undermines  the  public  interest  has  long  been  deeply  ingrained  in  the  social 
sciences. No less a liberal than Adam Smith offered cautionary words as to the free assembly of 
business people:   
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public … [T]hough the law cannot hinder 
…  [this]  assembling  together,  it  ought  to  do  nothing  to  facilitate  such  assemblies… 
(1976) 
More recently, Mancur Olson extended Smith’s perspective to considerations of macroeconomic 
development. In The Rise and Decline of Nations, one of the most comprehensive assessments of 
the relationship between institutions and growth, he argues that the marginal effect of increased 
activity by organized business (and other “distributional coalitions”) is economically significant 
and negative.
4 Specifically, he touches on at least three reasons as to why “organizations for 
                                                           
4 It would be wrong to argue, however, that Olson never recognized that such organizations could “mak[e] 
the pie that society produces larger.”  Although he downplays this point in                                , in 
                               (1965) he describes how many interest associations endure by providing “selective 
services,” some of which may be by-products of their lobbying activity and could be construed as net welfare 
enhancing: His later research, however, makes clear that he feels that any social welfare gains associated with 
these activities are swamped by the social losses of their rent-seeking.   3 
collective action” in the business community undermine a country’s ability to allocate resources 
effectively.
5 
Business organizations, for one, facilitate the rent-seeking foreseen by Smith. They invest 
in  redistributive  activities  (e.g.,  lobbying  and  cartelization)  and  thus  divert  resources  from 
investments  that  generate  new  wealth  (e.g.,  in  human  and  physical  capital).
6  For  another, 
business  organizations  retard  the  introduction  of  new  technologies.  By  producing 
disproportionate  changes  in  members’  production  costs,  innovations  may  require  costly 
bargaining over the collective’s new pricing and output policies, thus rendering it more averse to 
change than an individual firm. Organized business interests, moreover, often lobby for bailouts 
for failing firms and thereby slow the flow of resources to the most dynamic enterprises. Lastly, 
business organizations often try to protect rents by opposing trade liberalization, which can result 
in  losses  to  social  welfare  for  reasons  related  to  Ricardian  comparative  advantage  and  the 
weakening of competitive pressures. 
In his final book, Power and Prosperity, Olson adapts this basic framework to the post-
communist  world.  He  locates  the  source  of  Russia’s poor  economic  performance  within  the 
community of former state-owned firms, which, realizing how ill-prepared their inherited assets 
left them for competitive markets, collectively lobbied for massive bailouts.
7 The subsequent 
flow of subsidies slowed the rational re-allocation of resources and fed hyperinflation, thereby 
undermining  the  country’s  macroeconomic  performance.
8  Although  he  does  not  detail  the 
                                                           
5 Not surprisingly, this general perspective was espoused in the Soviet Union as well. The entry on business 
associations  (                      )  in                             p      (1976)  describes  them  as  “bourgeois 
organizations that unite capitalists … so as to increase profitability, trample the rights of workers, do battle 
with foreign competitors, and manipulate foreign and domestic policies in the interests of monopolistic 
capital.” Author’s translation.  
6 Olson actually makes the point that so long as “distributional coalitions” reduce the economy’s output by a 
fixed  amount  per  period,  efforts  to  redistribute  wealth  reduce  an  economy’s  level  of  income  at  any 
particularly point in time but not its growth rate over time. 
7 Just as Olson (1982) argued that a cataclysmic event like a world war could greatly weaken a country’s 
interest coalitions and thus pave the way for subsequent growth, his later work (2000) traces the roots of 
China’s impressive growth record during the last two decades of the twentieth century to Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution, which destroyed “the countless cliques engaged in covert collective action and other insider 
lobbies.” 
8  Olson’s  point  here  echoes  an  argument  made  by  Wilson  (1973)  about  the  provenance  of  business 
organizations in the United States. Wilson points out that the periods of high growth in organized business 
activity coincide with the rise of both organized labor and government antitrust activism at the turn of the 
century  and  later  during  the  Great  Depression.  In  other  words,  business  organizations  grow  up  during   4 
activities of specific business associations, his implication is clear.
9 Organized business can be 
just as destructive in the post-communist context as it is elsewhere.            
Much of the social science literature on business associations in Russia steers clear of 
judgments about their economic impact (Hanson and Teague, 2005; Kubicek, 1996; Sulakshin 
and Romanikhin, 2003), generally arguing that they have been ineffective advocates for business 
in an environment in which both civil society remains prone to political control and personal 
connections persist as the important channels for exercising influence.
10 But in this, they do not 
depart from the basic Olsonian perspective that business organizations for collective action are 
fundamentally geared toward lobbying. Indeed, similar approaches and conclusions characterize 
assessments of business associations elsewhere in post-communist Europe (McMenamin, 2002; 
Orenstein and Desai, 1997). 
The perspective that we have described so far, while not in any sense misguided, suffers 
from being too limited. For while it has long been recognized that business associations can and 
do pursue objectives that benefit their members to the net detriment of society, more recent 
research  has  highlighted  how,  particularly  in  countries  with  weak  states,  they  also  provide 
members  with  services  that  create  net  social  benefits  (Doner  and  Schneider,  2000).  Indeed, 
across  many  contexts,  they  have  been  credited  with  resolving  complex  collective  action 
problems and disseminating information related to technologies and the reliability of potential 
trade  partners  (Bennett,  1996;  Rauch,  2002;  Schaede,  2000;  Woodruff,  1998,  World 
Development Report 2002).  
A common theme linking many of these services is associations’ role in the transmission 
of knowledge, be it ultimately embodied in (1) capital, as new technologies introduced into the 
production process, (2) workers, as new skills received through training, or (3) managers, as new 
information  about  relevant  markets.  The  connection  here  is  not  particularly  surprising,  for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
periods of crisis when rents are threatened. Unger and van Waarden (1999) make a similar point on the basis 
of the Dutch experience. 
9 Olson does specifically reference the rent-seeking efforts of Civic Union, a party closely associated with the 
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, an association of “red directors” who lobbied for various 
forms of subsidies in the first half of the 1990s.  
10 Although far from being the focus of his article, Frye (2002) presents evidence, without commenting on 
potential social welfare effects, that membership in a Russian business association is strongly associated with 
success in influencing legislation at the regional and local levels.    5 
economists have long recognized that markets, on their own, tend to under-provide knowledge. 
Being  non-rival  and,  often,  non-excludable,  it  is  difficult  for  single  actors  to  appropriate  all 
potential social returns that accrue to investment in its generation. Thus without a collective 
solution,  there  may  well  be  “under-investment”  in  developing  new  technologies,  training 
workers  and  uncovering  valuable  information  about  the  identities  and  reliability  of  potential 
trade  partners.  In  the  context  of  strong  and  reliable  governments,  public  institutions  may 
mitigate,  or  even  solve,  these  problems.  But  where  public  institutions  are  weak  and/or 
ineffective, collective solutions may be more apt to come from the private sector (Doner and 
Schneider, 2000; World Development Report 2002). 
Indeed, there is some evidence from Russia as well as other transition countries that, to at 
least  some  degree,  business  associations  have  filled  a  post-communist  institutional  void. 
Recanatini  and  Ryterman  (2001)  demonstrate  that  members  in  Russia  experienced  less  of  a 
decline in output than non-members in the early 1990s, postulating that the former faced lower 
costs of learning about the identity and reliability of potential trade partners. Using data from 
five  post-communist  countries,  Johnson  et  al.  (2002)  find  that  members  in  associations  that 
disseminate information about prospective trade partners are more likely both to provide trade 
credit to their customers and to switch to a more price-competitive supplier. Building on their 
work, Pyle (2005a) shows that even when controlling for pre-existing inter-firm communication, 
business association membership is positively associated with the dissemination of information 
about contractual disputes.  Members, moreover, are shown to face lower transaction costs when 
confronting  an  arrears  problem  with  customers  (Pyle,  2005b).  However,  the  evidence  that 
associations  contribute  meaningful  value  to  post-communist  markets  is  not  overwhelming. 
Indeed, several respected commentators have questioned whether associations have played much 
of a role in mitigating market failures either in Russia (Hendley et al., 2000) or elsewhere in the 
region (Broadman et al., 2004; Hendley and Murrell, 2003).
11  
These last studies notwithstanding, the suggestion that associations may have important 
objectives unrelated to lobbying suggests that evaluating the nature of their economic impact is 
                                                           
11 Hendley      . (2000) note, for instance, that although 28% of the enterprises they surveyed in 1997 reported 
belonging to a business association, only 3.5% used them to check on the reliability of potential customers; 
similarly,  a  small  percentage  of  firms  reported  relying  on  associations’  services  to  resolve  transactional 
problems.   6 
more complex than perhaps previously thought. The activity of business associations in Russia, 
as elsewhere, should thus be understood within the context of two dimensions, which, for the 
purposes of shorthand, we might refer to as “market-supporting” and “rent-seeking.”  
Two Dimensions in the Russian Context 
Conceptualizing  the  activity  of  Russian  business  associations  within  such  a  two-
dimensional space has parallels within the literatures on the behavior of both individual firms 
and  commercial  business  groups.  Based  on  the  stocks  of  physical  and  relationship  capital 
inherited  from  the  Soviet  system,  Gaddy  and  Ickes  (2002)  describe  the  Russian  enterprise’s 
choice during the transition as one between adaptation to the competitive market and nurturing 
relationships  with  government  officials.
12  Across  most  sectors  of  the  economy,  the  former 
strategy,  they  argue,  requires  substantial  investments  in  physical  and  human  capital  and  the 
development of new trade linkages, so as to compensate for the economically irrational pattern 
of economic organization and resource allocation inherited from the Soviet system. The latter 
strategy, which they demonstrate has been quite popular, points in the direction of rent-seeking 
and investments in the perpetuation of the soft budget regime.
13 Huber and Wörgötter (1998) 
describe  a  similar  strategy  set  when  distinguishing  between  types  of  Russian  commercial 
networks.
14 Some “entrepreneurial” networks, they contend, are profit oriented, open to foreign 
capital and new members. Others are oriented toward “survival,” and are composed of firms that 
are  doubtful  of  their  prospects  in  a  liberalized  market  and,  hence,  are  geared  toward  rent 
extraction and promoting policies that limit new entry.
15 
                                                           
12 The authors clarify that these strategies are not mutually exclusive; rather a firm will choose to invest in the 
two  such  that  their  marginal  returns  are  equal.  Initial  conditions,  however,  predispose  many  firms  to 
concentrate almost exclusively on one activity or the other. 
13 Gaddy and Ickes suggest that this strategy has become the foundation of a “virtual economy” in which a 
large “value subtracting” segment of the economy is propped up through a web of subsidies, which ultimately 
emanate from the country’s large energy sector.  
14 The authors define networks as a hybrid organizational form between hierarchy and market in which either 
capital or trade based ties among firms create a set of connected exchange relationships that control business 
activities. 
15 Perotti and Gelfer (2001) are somewhat ambivalent in their assessment of where financial industrial groups 
(FIGs) should be placed within this two-dimensional space. They present data suggesting that bank-led FIGs 
reallocate capital away from their cash-rich enterprises in a manner suggestive of an internal capital market. 
They acknowledge, however, being unable to distinguish whether these flows represent a type of collective 
solution  to  institutional  deficiencies  (       problems  of  contracting  and  informational  asymmetries)  that   7 
Where  do  Russian  business  associations  fit  in  this  two  dimensional  space?  How 
supportive are they of economic restructuring and adaptation to the market? And how much akin 
are they to distributional coalitions? Ex ante, the answers to these questions are not obvious. 
Deduction alone does not point clearly down one or the other path. Russian markets have been 
held  back  by  the  absence  of  well-functioning  institutions  and  Russian  firms,  in  need  of 
investment and new trade ties, have as a result been harmed. The potential social value embodied 
in a collective solution that supports economic restructuring would thus appear to be great. On 
the  other  hand,  in  an  environment  of  insecure  property  rights  and  murky  policy-making 
processes, the potential returns to creating a redistribution-oriented lobby could promise high 
returns as well. Although organizations could embody and aggressively pursue both aims, it is 
also  possible  that  micro-level  disincentives  to  support  any  collective  objective  (e.g.,  the 
temptation to free ride on the provision of public goods) render the new associations largely 
ineffective regardless of their apparent aim.  
We are thus confronted with questions that can only be answered empirically.  But to 
date, there have been no comprehensive studies of the membership and activities of Russian 
business associations. Some of the research cited earlier has been based on surveys in which 
firms  have  been  asked  no  more  than  a  couple  questions  about  membership  in  a  business 
association (Pyle, 2005a; Hendley et al., 2000, Recanatini and Ryterman, 2001). Other studies 
that have been less data-centric (Hanson and Teague, 2005; Kubicek, 1996; Lehmbruch, 1999; 
Sulakshin and Romanikhin, 2003;) have tended to focus on a limited number of high profile case 
studies.
16 The existing research has only been able to offer an impressionistic or “tip of the 
iceberg” view of the business association community. To answer our questions, therefore, we 
must rely upon several recent surveys conducted by the author. These will be described in a 
subsequent  section.  But  first,  we  will  briefly  review  what  is  known  about  the  historical 
development of business associations in Russia.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
produces a more efficient allocation of resources or a mechanism for majority shareholders to extract rents 
from cash rich firms.  
16 Lehmbruch (1999) offers the most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis. Her case study of the trade 
associations in the timber industry acknowledges their role in providing informational and consulting services 
to members but argues that they primarily served as vehicles for maintaining access to public officials in the 
inter-firm competition for rents.   8 
Evolution of the Community of Business Associations 
Many of the first Russian associations grew up to promote the interests of cooperatives 
and other small-scale entrepreneurial ventures permitted during the perestroika era. Others were 
founded during the pre-1992 period by large state enterprises that, as centralized coordination of 
economic  activity  diminished,  sought  ways  to  both  maintain  pre-existing  inter-firm  ties 
(networks)  and  represent  collective  interests  vis  à  vis  public  officials.  Former  government 
ministry officials, unsure of how to use their institutional knowledge in the post-planning era, 
established a number of the first associations (Lehmbruch, 1999). Indeed, many firms are reputed 
to have joined more to avoid alienating powerful figures than to help them address their major 
concerns (Sulakshin and Romanikhin, 2003). Still other associations were set up to support the 
development of new branches of the economy, such as banking.  
According to existing accounts, with a few exceptions, many of these first associations 
were neither well organized nor clear in purpose. Few, for instance, held regular congresses with 
members. Indeed, some were used as “pocket associations,” “non-profit” vehicles to promote the 
financial  interests  of  the  individuals  that  founded  them.  There  were  several  noteworthy 
exceptions, including the two business associations that to this day remain the most developed 
and influential, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) and the Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry (TPP).  
Under the leadership of Arkady Volsky, RSPP initially developed as an alliance of “red 
directors” that offered, at most, measured support for market reform. Indeed, in 1992, it led a 
lobbying  effort  calling  for  wage  and  price  indexation,  foreign  investment  restrictions,  cheap 
energy and subsidized credits for its members – all to put the brakes on the liberalization and 
stabilization agendas of the Gaidar government (McFaul, 1993; Hanson and Teague, 2005). With 
respect to privatization, they supported transfers to sitting directors rather than outside owners 
and successfully lobbied for “Option Two” to be added to the Chubais program.  
By  1994,  RSPP  had  developed  a  network  of  affiliated  associations  to  provide 
information, consulting and legal and accounting services to its members throughout the country. 
And at the federal level, its “expert” institute actively participated in the drafting of the state’s 
economic programs and was consulted on bills before the Duma. After 1998, RSPP’s federal-
level  organization  attracted  some  of  the  leading  oligarchs  into  leadership  roles,  making  it   9 
decidedly more pro-market in orientation. During the Putin years, it has received perhaps the 
greatest amount of attention for not having aggressively defended one of its biggest patrons, 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in the Yukos affair (Hanson and Teague, 2005). Generally, though, both 
its regularized lobbying and service provision have gone un-noticed by commentators. Below the 
federal level, in particular, where its legally independent affiliates represent RSPP’s interests in 
all of the country’s territorial subjects, we have little sense of the respective bodies’ aims and 
impact.      
Like those of RSPP, the legally independent Chambers of Commerce and Industry are 
multi-branch associations that draw in members from a wide range of economic sectors. Now 
numbering 169, they have been uniquely constituted through a special 1993 law guaranteeing 
their independence from state bodies and broadly circumscribing their mission to the creation of 
favorable conditions for Russian business. The TPP also stands out within the community of 
business associations for being able to trace its roots directly back to a communist-era institution, 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Soviet Union, which worked with the Ministry of 
Trade to promote exports and imports with countries outside the communist trading bloc. For 
good  or  ill,  the  TPP  thus  inherited  a  set  of  physical  and  human  assets  that  has  shaped  its 
development path in the post-communist era. But despite the organization’s geographic reach 
within and outside the country, it has generally maintained a low profile. Although this changed 
somewhat with the election of Yevgenii Primakov to become the federal Chamber’s President in 
2001, almost nothing has been written about TPP’s activities, particularly in the regions.        
The  reforms  launched  in  1992  also  gave  rise  to  a  wave  of  national-level  branch 
organizations as well as a number of other sector-specific as well as multi-branch organizations 
that  operate  at  the  regional  and  territorial  levels.  The  lack  of  a  comprehensive  registry  has 
rendered accurate accounting of their numbers impossible.
17 But available information suggests 
they trended upwards in the latter half of the 1990s and, subsequently, during the Putin years.
18 
                                                           
17  In  an  interview  with  the  author,  the  Director  of  the  Department  for  Cooperation  with  Business 
Associations at the Chamber of Commerce of the Russian Federation commented that there may be as many 
as 5000 different business associations registered across Russia. 
18 With the exception of the Law “On Chambers of Commerce and Industry,” there is no encompassing legal 
framework regulating associations’ registration and activity.  They may register at the federal or sub-federal 
levels  as  one  of  four  organizational-legal  forms:  public  organization  (                         ),  non-
commercial partnership (                          ), association (or union) (           (    )), or chamber of 
commerce (                           ). All-Russian “public organizations” must register with the federal   10 
Unsurprisingly,  they  have  been  disproportionately  concentrated  in  Moscow  (Rossiiskiie 
obedineniia predprinimatlei, 2001).  
Business Association Surveys: Membership Rates and Characteristics  
In light of the lack of comprehensive sources of information about their composition, 
activities  and  impact,  the  author  designed  three  surveys  to  be  administered  by  the  Levada 
Analytical Centre between November 2003 and July 2004. First, to assess membership rates in 
business associations across firms of different size and industrial branch, a screening survey of 
1353  enterprises  was  carried  out  in  48  territorial  subjects  (i.e.,  over  half)  of  the  Russian 
Federation. Respondents were asked only to identify the firm’s ownership type and whether or 
not it (or a representative of its management)  was a member of a business association.  If  a 
member, they were then asked to provide the association’s name. By construction, slightly under 
half of the respondents were to employ between ten and one hundred workers, with the rest 
having workforces in excess of one hundred; they were, as well, to be distributed roughly equally 
across geographic space and seven non-energy-related industrial branches.
19  
The  mean  and  median  sizes  of  the  respondents  were  485  and  130  employees, 
respectively.  A  small  minority  of  those  surveyed,  6.8%,  reported  being  municipal  or  state 
enterprises; the others were private. Overall, 34.2% of the respondents reported being a member 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ministry of Justice but their inter-regional, regional and local counterparts register with the Ministry of Justice 
offices in the relevant federal subject.         and territorial Chambers of Commerce follow a similar pattern. 
Other associations register with authorized state agencies in the jurisdiction in which they operate. Depending 
upon the legal status under which they register, business associations may face entirely different restrictions 
upon their activity.  Those registered as associations or unions, for instance, cannot offer services for a fee, 
leaving  their  financing  almost  exclusively  dependent  on  member  dues.  The  members  of  associations 
registered  as  public  organizations  (                         )  cannot  be  juridical  persons  unless  they 
themselves are public organizations.  And members of unions or associations cannot be physical persons if 
they are not founders of the association. Since some small businesses are registered as physical and not as 
juridical persons, this requirement necessarily limits the development of their membership base.  Indeed, the 
absence  of  comprehensive  legislation  leads  some  associations  to  choose  seemingly  inappropriate 
organizational-legal forms. The Professional Union of Moscow Entrepreneurs registered under a special law 
designed  to  address  labor-management  relations  and  the  unionization  of  workers.    Currently,  the  non-
commercial  partnership  organizational  form  offers  the  legal  framework  most  conducive  to  growth  and, 
indeed, has become the most popular form in which to register (                        p   p    m     , 2001). 
19 For those with more than one hundred employees, we surveyed equal numbers across branches. But within 
each branch, we sought the distribution with respect to employment represented in the national firm registry 
supplied  by       m    .  For  instance,  the  same  numbers  of  firms  were  surveyed  in  the  chemical  and 
metallurgical industries but the latter group included a relatively higher proportion of enterprises with over 
500 employees. Using local business registries, firms were then selected at random to fulfill the regional, 
branch and size quotas.   11 
of at least one business association, while 6.7% reported being in at least two.
20  With respect to 
specific  associations,  as  we  suspected,  membership  rates  in  a  Chamber  of  Commerce  or  an 
affiliate of the RSPP were the highest, 15.2% and 7.8%, respectively. By branch, membership 
rates ranged from a low of 27.0% in metallurgy to a high of 44.6% in light industry. As shown in 
Figure 1, in each of the branches, membership rates increase in the size of the firms such that, 
overall, the rate in firms with over 500 employees (57.6%) substantially exceeded that in firms of 
under 100 (21.4%). 
Figure 1. Membership rates by sector and size
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This screening survey was used as the basis for a more detailed survey of 606 firms 
conducted from May to July in 2004.  Once again, the objective was to achieve roughly equal 
distribution across branches within the context of a regionally balanced sampling. But here, by 
construction,  half  of  the  firms  were  to  be  members  of  associations  and  half  were  not.  The 
screening survey’s findings of membership rate variation across branches and employment size 
were used to weight the sample’s distribution of members and non-members across these two 
dimensions.
21 In addition to standard firm-specific information -- e.g., organizational history, 
                                                           
20 Just 1.2% reported belonging to more than two. Of the private firms, 35.0% belong to at least one 
association; the membership rate of the state or municipally owned enterprise was less, 23.9%. 
21 So, for instance, the ratio of members to non-members in the sample was relatively high in light industrial 
firms with over 500 employees and relatively low in those with under 100 employees in the metallurgical 
sector. To fulfill the regional, branch, size and association membership quotas, firms were selected for this 
survey at random from the participants in the initial screening survey.  In the event of a refusal, another firm 
with similar characteristics was selected from the screening survey to replace it. And if no firms remained that   12 
ownership structure, size and performance measures, perceived barriers to business operations, 
etc. – the survey asked firm managers a series of questions about their interaction with business 
associations.  Some  of  these  latter  questions  were  directed  at  all  firms  and  some  were  only 
designed to be answered by members of associations.  
A third survey, administered at the same time to the directors of two hundred business 
associations, asked questions relating to the organization’s origin, membership, finances, internal 
governance, density, services and interaction with public officials.
22 Without an official registry 
of  business  associations,  a  variety  of  sources  were  used  to  generate  a  sample  of  active 
associations. A primary objective here was to achieve adequate representation of multi-branch as 
well  as  branch-specific  organizations  in  those  industrial  sectors  in  which  we  were  sampling 
firms.
23 An effort was also made to include associations representing regional units across the 
country and at different jurisdictional levels – federal, regional and municipal.
24 Finally, given 
the  large  percentages  of  firms  that  reported  in  the  screening  survey  belonging  to  different 
Chambers of Commerce and affiliates of RSPP, roughly proportionate numbers of both were 
included in the sample. The distribution of years over which the surveyed associations were 
founded is recorded in Figure 2A.   
Who Is and Is Not a Member?    
Of the 280 business association members in the larger survey, 68.6% reported belonging 
to just one, 21.8% to two, and just under 10% belong to three or more. These firms, we found, 
were  a  bit  more  likely  than  non-members  to  have  been  privatized  (60.7%  and  50.3%, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
matched the required characteristics, the surveying organization randomly selected firms on the basis of lists 
compiled  from  alternative  sources  of  information.  In  all,  506  firms  from  the  original  screening  survey 
responded to the large questionnaire; the remaining 100 were drawn from other sources. The participation 
rate among those firms that had been in the screening survey was 68%; for those selected from outside the 
context of the screening survey, the rate was 42%. 
22 Density refers to the extent to which the association’s membership includes all firms in a particular sector, 
geographic region,    .  For example, for a sector-specific business association, one measure of density would 
be the share of total output in the sector that its members account for.  
23 The construction of the sample was carried out in association with personnel at the Coordinating Council 
of Employers’ Associations of Russia, an association of Russian business associations. Online and published 
sources were used as well as consultations with experts inside the community of business associations. 
24 The final breakdown is as follows: 131 multi-branch associations with 73 of these operating at the level of a 
territorial subject (republic,     ,       ’,    .), 53 at the more narrowly defined “territorial” level (city,      ,    .) 
and 5 encompassing the entire Federation; of the 69 sector-specific associations, 39 operated at the federal 
level and the remainder within smaller jurisdictions.   13 
respectively), and a bit less likely to have been de novo enterprises (35.0% and 42.0%) or wholly 
state (or municipally) owned (3.6% and 6.4%).
25  
We  asked  enterprise  directors  a  series  of  questions  about  the  two  associations  most 
important to their enterprise. In Table 1, we provide a breakdown of the types of associations to 
which the respondents belong. Among the economic sectors that we surveyed, the Chambers of 
Commerce  (TPP)  and  the  network  of  affiliates  of  RSPP  can  claim  relatively  high  national 
membership rates.  Specifically, we find that 46.7% of our member-respondents belong to a 
regional  or  territorial  TPP  while  16.9%  have  joined  RSPP’s  independent,  sub-national 
organizations. Roughly one-quarter, or 26.8%, are members of a multi-branch association other 
than RSPP and TPP. Roughly a third, 32.4%, report being members of branch associations, the 
plurality of which belong to national-level associations. 
Table 1. What are the two most important associations to which you belong? 
   
  % of all associations mentioned 
Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (    )  12.8%   
Regional    9.8% 
Territorial    3.0% 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (   )  35.2%   
Regional    27.9% 
Territorial    7.4% 
Multi-Branch*  21.9%   
All-Russian    5.7% 
Regional    11.5% 
Territorial    4.6% 
Branch  26.5%   
All-Russian    12.8% 
Regional    8.7% 
Territorial    4.9% 
Other or no type specified  4.1%   
 
* Not including RSPP and TPP. 
 
As for why firms do not currently belong to an association, some explicitly cited resource 
constraints. In addition to the 19% who referenced “insufficient time,” just over 10% cited the 
“high cost of membership dues.” Overall, the median annual due paid by members amounted to 
                                                           
25 A small number of firms in the survey were “enterprises without the creation of a juridical person.”    14 
roughly $200, but there is a great deal of variation; a number of firms, moreover, report also 
making additional contributions in both cash and kind.   
In addition to those that reported not belonging because they found the time and/or dues 
prohibitive, half of non-members explicitly (50.6%) stated that they did not think that association 
membership would in any way be useful for their businesses and an almost equally large number 
(39.6%) responded that they believed that they could address their problems more effectively on 
their own. Our evidence suggests that not being a member is rarely the result of ignorance; only 
8.6%  of  current  non-members  reported  being  unaware  of  business  associations  and  their 
activities. A small percentage of non-members, 2.1%, reported being in the process of applying.   
Among the surveyed firms, 11.6% report having been a member of an association to 
which they no longer belong.
26  Of these, roughly one-third (31.9%) left due to the perceived 
inability of the association to represent the firm’s interests before public officials (either through 
general lobbying or direct participation in the legislative process); roughly one in six (15.9%) 
expressed a general sense that the services offered by the association were inadequate. Equal 
numbers (10.1%) report discontinuing membership because of either policy disagreements or the 
association’s dissolution. And a comparatively small percentage, 8.7%, report being unable to 
afford the association’s dues. Finally, 5.8% of firms report having left an association explicitly 
because they were joining another association. This suggests a relatively low level of churning 
and not a great degree of competition among associations for members.  
There is little evidence that associations are terribly exclusive. Indeed, only one current 
non-member in our survey reported having been denied admission to an association.  And of 
current members only one-sixth reported knowing about a situation in which an association to 
which they belong dropped a member. Most of these cases, roughly three-quarters, related to 
financial issues (not paying dues or declaring bankruptcy) while a much smaller number related 
to  the  violation  of  the  association’s  standards  or  business  ethics.    And  only  ten  percent  of 
members knew of even a single circumstance in which a firm wanted to enter but was not given 
the opportunity.  Of these, the applicant’s poor reputation and known violation of business ethics 
was the specific response cited the most frequently. 
                                                           
26 Two-thirds of these firms were members of at least one association at the time of the survey.    15 
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The years during which firms report having joined can be used to provide a sense of how 
flows into associations have changed across time.
27 As we can see in Figure 2B, a small minority 
reports having entered associations (to which they continue to belong) in the Soviet era. After 
1992, entry has been steady but seems to have picked up during the Putin years.  Indeed, the 
                                                           
27 Of course, this metric offers only an imperfect picture of inflows and how they might have changed over 
time. Because we neither observe firms nor associations that no longer exist, our measure as to inflows is 
more downwardly biased the further in the past we look.   16 
single biggest annual spike in membership occurred in 2000.
28 Putting together the small number 
of reported membership terminations with the joining dates leads us to conclude that there has 
been a noteworthy increase in membership in business associations during the Putin era.   
Members’ Behavior 
  Having provided a brief overview of the surveys, we now return to our question as to 
whether  the  activity  of  associations  is  generally  antithetical  to  or  supportive  of  the  broad 
objectives of economic restructuring. The multiple instruments allow us to approach the question 
from the perspective of both firms and associations. We begin with the former and proceed on 
the assumption that the manner in which members’ behavior differs from that of non-members 
offers insight into the nature and purposes of organizations to which they belong.
29  
  Olson’s writing actually provides a framework, of sorts, for distinguishing the types of 
behavior germane to our question. As mentioned above, The Rise and Decline of Nations notes 
three ways in which interest associations in the business community slow a country’s economic 
development:  (1)  they  divert  resources  to  rent-seeking  and  thus,  ceteris  paribus,  away  from 
investments that could enhance the economy’s productivity; (2) they retard the introduction of 
new technologies; and (3) they oppose the liberalization of trade flows.
30  If the population of 
Russian business associations is geared toward the sorts of behavior envisioned by Olson, we 
would  expect  those  objectives  to  be  reflected  in  the  behavior  of  members,  either  because 
associations  themselves  promote  it  or  because  they  attract  firms  that  are  independently  so 
inclined, or both.  
  But this is not what we observe. Using firm-level indicators that capture the sorts of 
behavior  that  Olson  predicted  at  the  association  level,  the  members  of  Russia’s  business 
associations  do  not  appear  to  represent  the  distributional  coalitions  that  he  envisioned.  As 
                                                           
28 This finding is at odds from Wilson’s observation (1973) based on data from the United States that net 
flows into associations are counter-cyclical. The recent upward spike in membership appears is particularly 
characteristic of branch associations; over half of the respondents that reported belonging to one have joined 
since 2000. 
29  Organizations,  it  is  true,  may  amount  to  more  than  the  sum  of  their  parts;  and  the  motivation  and 
objectives  of  member  businesses  conceivably  could  differ  from  association’s  management  (Moore  and 
Hamalai,  1993).  For  associations  that  are  voluntary,  and  many  of  which  are  successfully  attracting  new 
members, this does not seem as likely.  
30 These behaviors, incidentally, closely resemble those that Gaddy and Ickes (2002) contend characterize the 
firms that comprise the value-destroying segment of the Russian “virtual economy.”   17 
demonstrated  in  Table  2,  association  members  are  more  likely  to  have  engaged  in  actions 
typically  interpreted  as  restructuring  in  response  to  the  introduction  of  market  incentives  or 
changing market conditions. In the three years prior to the survey, greater percentages report 
having made investments in their workforce and capital stock. Moreover, association members 
report  having  made  investments  in  new  technologies  and  modes  of  production  at  rates  that 
exceed non-members. Association members also demonstrate a greater proclivity for expanding 
exchange  relations  abroad.  In  the  three  years  prior  to  the  survey,  30.5%  of  members  had 
increased their exposure to foreign markets either through sales or purchases in the SNG or other 
countries. The comparable figure for non-members is only 17.1%.  
Table 2. Behavioral strategies and characteristics of non-members and members 
 
Non-members  Members 
 
Provided (re)training of personnel in past 3 years (%)  71.5  87.9  ** 
Expanded activity in foreign markets in past 3 years + (%)  17.1  30.5  ** 
Invested in plant & equipment (construction, capital repair) in past 3 years (%)  61.4  77.9  ** 
New technologies/modes of production introduced in past 3 years (%)   66.3  82.9  ** 
Member of commercial group (    ,    ,        ,    .) (%)  19.0  25.0   
        enterprise (%)  42.0  35.0   
Employees  360.2  811.1  ** 
Capital utilization rate (%)  68.2  69.4   
Level of competition (index over 3-year period) ++  3.86  3.87   
Age of director  47.5  49.6  * 
+ Increased purchases or sales in either the     countries or elsewhere 
++ Measure on 1-5 scale, with 5 representing intense competition 
** Using chi-square test of association or t-test on equality of means, difference significant at 1% level; * at 5% 
level.  
 
Although these comparisons do not necessarily establish that associations are themselves 
the cause of these differences, the consistent relationship between membership and dynamic, 
market-adapting  behaviors  strongly  suggests  that  business  organizations  have  not  become  a 
refuge for firms preoccupied by frustrating the growth of markets or modifying their outcomes. 
Of course, it would be natural to surmise that the relationships we observe between association 
membership  and  evidence  of  restructuring  is  being  driven  by  some  third  variable  whose 
influence could be controlled for using regression analysis. For instance, we might expect that   18 
enterprise size, shown to be related to association membership, also is related to investment 
behavior and involvement in international trade.  
We  thus  examine  this  possibility  in  a  series  of  probit  regressions  investigating  the 
correlates of firm restructuring: 
Pr (yi =1) = Pr (β0 + β1BAi + β2Fi + εi > 0) = Φ (β0 + β1BAi + β2Fi),  (1) 
where yi =1 if the firm engaged in a particular restructuring strategy in the three years prior to the 
survey;
 BAi is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the firm reports belonging to at 
least one business association; Fi represents a vector of other firm-specific variables; and Φ(•) is 
the normal cumulative distribution function.  
Many of the firm-specific characteristics that we include are typically controlled for in 
studies of restructuring during the post-communist transition. Although researchers have turned 
up  noteworthy  differences  in  the  determinants  of  enterprise  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  CIS 
countries, a number of studies from across the region have highlighted the positive association 
between restructuring and private ownership, a greater ownership role for outsiders (particularly 
foreigners) and more robust competition (Djankov and Murrell, 2002).  Firm-specific controls 
thus include subjectively determined measures of both the level of competition faced by the firm 
over  the  prior  three-year  period  and  the  influence  exercised  by  various  groups  of  owners 
(government  bodies,  enterprise  management,  non-management  workers,  other  Russian 
individuals and firms, and foreigners). We also include a dummy variable capturing whether the 
firm was created as a de novo enterprise, as opposed to having roots in the communist economy; 
this acts as a rough proxy for the firm’s age. In addition to the control for business association 
membership,  we  include  a  dummy  for  membership  in  a  commercial  group  (e.g.,  a  holding 
company  or  financial  industrial  group)  hypothesizing  that  it  may  facilitate  restructuring  by 
reducing inter-firm transaction costs (Perotti and Gelfer, 2001). Additional controls are included 
for the director’s age, the firm’s sector as well as for its size (in terms of employment) and 
capital utilization rate in 2001. 
Table 3 presents strong evidence that membership in a business association is strongly 
and positively associated with restructuring-type behavior even after controlling for other firm 
characteristics.  Over the previous three years, association members were roughly ten percent 
more likely to have invested in plant and equipment and thirteen percent more likely to have   19 
invested both in new technologies and worker training.  Finally, they were eight percent more 
likely  to  have  expanded  exports  or  imports.    All  of  these  relationships  were  statistically 
significant at the 5% level at least. 
Table 3. Restructuring behaviors during previous three years 
         
  Invested in 
plant and 
equipment (    , 
capital repair) 
Invested in 
new technology 
/modes of 
production 
Invested in 
worker training 
Expanded 
trade relations 
within SNG or 
abroad 
         
Member of business association  0.098**  0.132***  0.131***  0.080** 
  (2.21)  (3.26)  (3.69)  (2.02) 
0.032  0.130***  -0.006  0.040  Member  of  commercial  group  (    , 
   ,        ,    .)  (0.60)  (2.77)  (0.12)  (0.86) 
        enterprise  0.073  0.143***  -0.042  0.093** 
  (1.50)  (3.27)  (1.07)  (2.03) 
Log employees (2001)  0.084***  0.068***  0.049***  0.091*** 
  (4.68)  (4.07)  (3.30)  (5.88) 
Capital utilization rate (2001)  0.000  -0.000  0.001  -0.000 
  (0.63)  (0.05)  (0.82)  (0.48) 
0.032  0.016  -0.016  0.017  Level  of  competition  (index  of 
average over period)  (1.58)  (0.87)  (0.94)  (0.92) 
Age of director  -0.006***  -0.003  -0.003**  -0.005*** 
  (3.05)  (1.64)  (2.01)  (2.65) 
         
Ownership controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of observations  536  533  536  521 
Pseudo R-square  .1780  .1000  .1567  .1613 
 
The findings in Table 3, which highlight the correlates of changes that took place over a 
three-year period, are reflected in measures current capital stock quality. Association members 
utilize  technologies  that  exceed  domestic  branch  averages  at  almost  twice  the  rate  of  non-
members. Members, moreover, engage in international trade at higher rates. Over one-quarter of 
members export to the SNG countries and/or other foreign markets, compared to roughly one-
sixth of non-members. The disparity is even greater with respect to imports.
31  
                                                           
31 At the time of the survey, greater percentages of members reported selling their output to (72.1% and 
57.4%) and purchasing inputs from (73.6% and 50.9%) trade partners in the national market outside their 
immediate locale.   20 
The consistency of these results is striking. Clearly, associations’ members seem to be 
engaged in behaviors that suggest greater adaptation to markets than non-members. At least in 
the context of this stage of the post-communist transition, this finding would seem to call into 
question Olson’s hypothesis that the primary motivation of business associations is to suppress 
competition and/or push for governmental modification of markets’ outcomes. 
The strong association between membership and restructuring could be interpreted as a 
reflection of membership’s value. The dissemination of information and knowledge, after all, be 
it relating to investments in physical or human capital or market opportunities in distant locales, 
is a role that has been attributed to business associations in other contexts (Doner and Schneider, 
2000).  But it is also possible that firms of a particular type self-select into associations. That is, 
the relationships that we observe in Table 3 may be the product not of the association itself but of 
an  unobserved  variable  that  influences  both  association  membership  and  restructuring 
strategies.
32  In  other  words,  we  still  are  confronted  by  a  question  of  whether  the  apparent 
“business association effect” is the result of organized business, per se, or the businesses that 
organize.   
Member Services: Innovation and Investment 
One way of addressing this question is through a direct assessment of the associations’ 
activities. In Table 4, we present responses from the questionnaire directed to the managers of 
business associations. Of the two hundred surveyed, slightly over half reported offering some 
services related to innovation and investment in 2001. By 2004, the rate had climbed to nearly 
two-thirds.
33 The specific services cited by association members can be roughly divided into two 
types – those that involve the direct provision of information and those in which the association 
facilitates contacts between and among different economic actors. With respect to the former, 
roughly  half  of  associations  report  “providing  information  about  new  technologies  and 
                                                           
32 In more technical terms, we may be confronting selection bias –     , when the regressor is correlated with 
the residual term. If this is the case, than any regressor correlated with the unmeasured factor will end up 
proxying for it. 
33 Note that the increase in the rate of associations offering these services may be a product of the way in 
which the sample was created as much as, or perhaps more than, it reflects an overall trend in business 
association activity. That is, an effort was made to include only those associations among the most active in 
2004. If a similar criterion had been used in 2001, we may have observed rates of service provision similar to 
those found for 2004.     21 
equipment,” while a third assist in evaluating the effectiveness of new technologies. With respect 
to  the  latter,  significant  percentages  of  associations  report  playing  roles  in  organizing  and 
administering exhibitions related to new technologies and in helping to develop collaborative 
research relationships with foreign and domestic partners. Associations also facilitate financing 
of  investment  by  arranging  meetings  of  their  members  with  investors  and  by  providing 
recommendations for firms seeking financing.  
Table 4. Services related to innovation and investment 
 
% of associations  
How important to 
members  
(1-5 scale) 
  2001  2004  2001  2004 
Did / does your association offer any services related to 
innovation and investment?  54.5  66.5 
   
Did / does your association provide any of the following services?     
Provide information about new technologies and equipment  45.5  54.0  3.8  4.2 
Assist in organizing and administering exhibitions relating to new 
technologies   40.0  48.0  3.8  4.1 
Assist in developing collaborative relationships with Russian and 
foreign firms engaged in innovative activities  39.5  47.5  3.7  4.0 
Assist in evaluating effectiveness and new technologies  30.0  35.5  3.7  4.0 
Provide consulting services relating to application of new 
technologies, equipment, etc.  31.0  35.0  3.7  3.9 
Assist in joint research and development projects  24.5  28.5  3.6  3.9 
Provide assistance in receiving credit (provide collateral, 
recommendation, etc.)  28.0  37.0  3.6  4.1 
Assist in accessing resources from local and regional budgets for 
enterprise development  29.5  36.5  3.6  4.0 
Organize mutual crediting  13.0  16.5  3.0  4.0 
Assist in attracting investment (Russian and foreign) by organizing 
bilateral meetings of businesses and investors, etc.  35.5  45.5  3.8  4.2 
 
In an interview with the author, an officer of the St. Petersburg Union of Entrepreneurs 
reported how his organization facilitates the functioning of capital markets by helping to mitigate 
information asymmetries between external investors and member businesses. In particular, he 
described how foreign investors have  approached their association with a  general interest in 
investing in the regional economy  but feeling constrained by the difficulties associated with 
identifying worthy firms. This particular association, founded during the perestroika years and   22 
having since grown into one of the oblast’s largest, provides consulting services to many of its 
members, most of which are small and medium-sized enterprises. The association’s officers thus 
get to know these firms well and are thus able to identify for external investors those that are 
reliable  and  have  good  prospects.  The  reputational  capital  that  a  large,  well-established 
organization  can  put  at  stake  may  be  sufficient  to  convince  external  investors  that  the 
association’s incentives to provide reliable information are properly aligned. 
Tables 5A and 5B provide confirmation from firms as to the receipt of these types of 
services. Of association members, 11.5% reported receiving services from associations relating 
to  investment.  Of  these,  the  provision  of  assistance  in  securing  credit  by  providing  a 
recommendation  to  an  external  lender  was  cited  the  most  frequently.  And  assistance  in  the 
organization of meetings with investors was mentioned, as well, by over one-third of these firms. 
It is thus perhaps not surprising that of those firms that reported having made investments in the 
previous three years, members of associations report having utilized financing from a Russian 
bank at higher rates: 50.9% to 42.0%; non-member firms were more likely to have used retained 
earnings: 93.0% to 86.7%.
34 This evidence is consistent with the proposition that associations 
play a role in collecting and disseminating information in a way that mitigates search costs, 
information  asymmetries  and  contract  enforcement  problems.
35  With  respect  to  external 
financing, this may be the result, in part, of some associations formally including as members 
both manufacturing enterprises and financial institutions. Indeed, of members reporting having 
invested  in  their  plant  in  the  previous  three  years,  56.3%  of  those  whose  association  also 
included at least one bank as a member received a bank loan.  
We should note that Table 5A also reveals that one-fifth of association members that 
report  having  received  “investment-related”  services  purportedly  received  help  acquiring 
financial resources from regional and local budgets. However, among firms that had invested in 
the  previous  three  years,  members  of  associations  were  no  more  likely  to  have  used  public 
                                                           
34 Both these differences are significant at the 10% level. Gaddy and Ickes (2002) argue that the value 
subtracting enterprises in the “virtual economy” benefit from less transparency in their operations, making 
them less likely recipients of external finance than enterprises that have adapted to the market.  
35 Macaulay’s seminal work on relational contracting (1963) notes associations’ important role in improving 
information flows in the United States.   23 
resources to finance investment activity.
36 So even though some report that associations facilitate 
access to public monies, these services do not appear to give member firms any greater access 
than non-member firms to public financial flows. 
Table 5A. Investment-related services received from business associations 
  % of firms that invested  
in past 3 years 
Business association members that have used associations to receive  11.5 
   
Of those that used associations’ services, percentage that used them for 
Providing collateral or recommendation to secure credit  44.0 
Assisting in the organization of meetings with investors  36.0 
Providing general consulting services related to investment activity  24.0 
Helping acquire financial resources from regional and local budgets  20.0 
 
Table 5B. Innovation-related services received from business associations 
  % of firms that introduced new 
technology /modes of 
production in past 3 years 
Business association members that have used associations to receive  28.0 
   
Of those that used associations’ services, percentage that used them for 
Information on trade fairs, exhibits  78.5 
Assisting in organization of and participation in trade fairs, exhibits in 
Russia an abroad  40.0 
Assistance in developing collaborative relations with Russian and foreign 
enterprises to develop new equipment, materials, modes of production  24.6 
Assistance in evaluating effectiveness of new innovations  12.3 
Consulting with respect to adapting new technologies  18.5 
Help in coordinating joint research  21.5 
Information on new technologies, equipment and materials  46.2 
 
                                                           
36 Of association members that had engaged in capital repairs in previous three years, 6.9% report receiving 
financing from regional or local “organs of power.” The comparable figure for non-members is 7.0%.   24 
Table 5C. How, in general, do specialists at your firm learn about new technology, 
equipment and modes of production  
(if invested in past 3 years in new technology)? 
       
  Non-members  Members   
       
Trade fairs and exhibitions  80.1  87.1  * 
Russian business partners  63.4  60.3   
Foreign business partners  18.5  35.3  ** 
Scientific/research institutes, laboratories with which 
collaborate  23.1  39.2  ** 
Business associations  6.5  22.8  ** 
Consulting firms  3.2  9.1  * 
Russian competitors (    , when see their output)  35.6  44.0   
Foreign competitors (    , when see their output)  12.0  25.0  ** 
Specialist journals and internet   75.5  81.9   
** Difference significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.     
 
Of  member  firms  that  report  having  introduced  new  technologies  and  modes  of 
production in the three years prior, 28% report having been assisted by business associations. As 
can be observed in Table 5B, associations play an important role with respect to organizing and 
disseminating information on trade fairs and exhibitions. Indeed, in Table 5C we observe that 
large percentages of both members and non-members learn about new technologies by attending 
such fairs – with members reporting benefiting from them at a slightly higher rate. Based on the 
firms’  own  reporting,  associations  also  directly  provide  information  on  new  technologies, 
equipment and materials or provide consulting services relating to their adoption. Indeed, among 
firms that had introduced new technologies and production processes, members are much more 
likely to have learned about them directly from a business association. Non-members, however, 
do sometimes receive such services as well but at a much lower rate.  
We should note here that with respect to offering services to non-members, associations 
report having adopted different models. Over half (52.9%) provides a greater range of services to 
members than non-members. And of these, roughly one-half do not provide any services to non-
members.  The  remainder,  which  includes  substantial  percentages  of  the  regional  and  local   25 
Chambers, formally makes the same array of services available to all firms.
37 No matter what the 
model, however, the prevailing norm is for non-members to pay more.
38 Indeed, in a number of 
cases, members of some associations receive services at a marginal price of zero, particularly if 
dues  payments  are  current,  the  firm  participates  actively  in  the  life  of  the  association  or  a 
particular service is deemed particularly critical to the firm’s well-being.  
As can also be observed from Table 5B, associations play a role in bringing economic 
actors together, providing assistance both in developing collaborative relations and coordinating 
joint research. Although there is no evidence that business association members learn about new 
technologies from their business partners in Russia at greater rates than non-members, Table 5C 
does show that among those that have introduced new technologies, members are more likely to 
have benefited from the services of consulting firms and scientific-research institutes. Members 
are also more likely to benefit from the technological spillovers received from their exposure to 
foreign firms (either as competitors or business partners). 
Member Services: Working Training and Recruitment 
In  Table  6,  we  observe  that  two-thirds  of  the  associations  surveyed  report  having 
provided services relating to the training and recruitment of personnel. Well over half offers 
programs focusing on specialists (e.g., managers and engineers) and consider them among the 
most  critical  services  they  offer.  A  somewhat  smaller  percentage  sponsors  programs  geared 
toward skilled workers.  
Table 6. Services related to training and recruitment of personnel 
  % of 
associations  
How important to 
members (1-5 scale) 
  2001  2004  2001  2004 
Did / does your association offer any services related to 
training and recruiting personnel?  56.5  65.5 
   
Did / does your association provide any of the following specific services?   
Assistance in (re-) training of specialists (engineers, managers,    .)  49.5  56.5  3.9  4.3 
Assistance in (re-) training of skilled workers  33.5  40.5  3.6  4.0 
Assistance in the selection/recruitment of personnel  30.5  36.0  3.3  3.9 
                                                           
37 A small number of respondents to our survey reports not offering services. 
38 Of those that report servicing non-members, roughly one-third of the services they provide are extended to 
non-members.   26 
Certification of personnel  16.0  19.5  3.4  3.7 
Conducting seminars for the staff of business (workers) 
associations  41.0  50.0  3.9  4.3 
 
As was true of investment and technology-related services, the responses of association 
managers seem to reflect an assessment that associations are playing an increasingly influential 
role in the life of firms. More associations, that is, report offering these services at the time of the 
survey  than  in  2001.  And  a  greater  percentage  describes  those  services  as  being  extremely 
important to their members. This assessment would seem to be confirmed by the responses of 
firms. As is laid out in Table 7A, over one-quarter of association members that engaged in 
worker training in the previous three years relied on associations for some form of assistance in 
the  general  areas  of  either  training  or  recruitment.  The  associations’  managerial  training 
programs  were  the  most  popular.    But  non-trivial  numbers  reported  using  associations  for 
training skilled workers as well.  
As we see in Table 6, associations’ role in helping firms find workers and formally verify 
their quality is not as great. Roughly a third of the associations provide assistance in recruiting 
workers; and just over one-sixth provides assistance relating to worker certification. Moreover, 
association managers that do provide these services do not seem to regard them as critical to their 
members  as  the  training  programs.  Indeed,  members  themselves  confirm  that  the  use  of 
associations for recruitment purposes has not been widespread. And it is not clear that members 
have used associations for this purpose any more than non-members.  
Table 7A. Training and recruitment-related services received from business associations 
  % of firms that invested in 
worker training programs 
within past 3 years 
Business association members that have used associations to receive  20.4 
   
Of those that used associations’ services, percentage that used them for 
Assistance in organizing training of specialists (engineers, managers)  79.6 
Assistance in organizing training of skilled workers  42.6 
Assistance in recruitment / selection of personnel  20.4 
Certification of personnel  25.9 
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Table 7B. What mechanisms have you used to hire workers  
(if workforce has expanded in past 3 years)? 
       
  Managers 
Technical personnel 
/ engineers  Skilled workers  Unskilled workers 
  Non-  Member  Non-  Member  Non-  Member  Non-  Member 
Independently through 
enterprise’s personnel office  19.8  25.3  30.2  38.5  52.1  53.8  46.9  60.4 * 
Government employment 
centers  15.6  15.4  20.8  30.8  39.6  41.8  37.5  45.1 
Private employment services  4.2  14.3 *  5.2  16.5 *   6.3   16.5 *   2.1  12.1 ** 
Business associations  0.0  4.4 *  1.0  2.2  2.1  2.2  0.0  3.3 
Advertisements using mass 
media (“want ads”)  24.0  23.1  30.2  40.7  45.8  52.7  37.5  46.2 
Informal recommendations  43.8  46.2  58.3  50.5  52.1  48.4  36.5  30.8 
Didn’t recruit worker type  26.0  25.3  10.4  12.1  3.1  4.4  8.3  4.4 
** Difference between members and non-members significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level. 
 
In many cases, firms that have recently expanded their workforce have relied on other 
third parties for recruitment (see Table 7B). Roughly one sixth of association members that fall 
into this category report having used private employment services when recruiting new managers 
(or another category of worker), a rate that exceeds that of non-members by a factor of three. 
Much  larger  percentages  of  these  expanding  firms  use  government  employment  centers  or 
informal referrals for recruiting workers of different types.  
Member Services: Facilitating New Trade Relations 
  We lastly turn to the manner in which associations may be facilitating the development of 
new trade relationships, both with customers  and suppliers. As we noted earlier,  association 
members are more likely to interact with trade partners outside their immediate locale, both 
domestically and abroad. And just within the past three years, business association membership 
was shown to be strongly associated with having developed new trade ties with either SNG or 
non-SNG countries. In the survey given to associations, we observe that nearly three quarters 
offer some combination of services relating to marketing new products.    28 
Table 8. Services related to market research and establishing new exchange relationships 
received from business associations 
 
% of associations  
How important to 
members (1-5 scale) 
  2001  2004  2001  2004 
Does (did) your association offer any services related to 
market research?  61.0  71.0 
   
Does (did) your association provide any of the following market-research related services? 
Market research  39.0  44.0  3.9  4.2 
Information on prices and production in various markets   50.5  60.0  4.0  4.2 
Information on demand conditions in foreign and domestic 
markets  46.5  54.0  3.9  4.1 
Assistance in search for Russian clients  48.0  58.5  3.9  4.1 
Assistance in search for foreign clients  40.5  48.0  3.8  4.0 
Information on trade fairs and exhibits  56.5  66.5  4.2  4.5 
Assistance in organizing and participation in trade fairs and 
exhibits  54.5  63.5  4.3  4.5 
Assistance in placing ads (on association website, in its journals, 
   .)  46.0  57.5  4.0  4.3 
Does (did) your association provide other services related to establishing new exchange relationships? 
Information on reliability of prospective trade partners   43.5  52.0  3.9  4.2 
Certification of goods and services  28.5  31.5  4.1  4.2 
Assistance in evaluating quality of goods and services  34.5  37.5  4.0  4.4 
Consultation on entering into contracts   36.5  39.5  3.7  4.1 
 
Table 9. Marketing and sales-related services received from business associations 
Business association members that have used associations to receive  24.3 
   
Of those that used associations’ services, percentage that used them for 
Market research  33.8 
Information on prices and production in various markets   41.2 
Information on demand conditions in foreign and domestic markets  19.1 
Assistance in search for Russian clients  30.9 
Assistance in search for foreign clients  7.4 
Information on trade fairs and exhibits  44.1 
Assistance in organizing and participation in trade fairs and exhibits  39.7 
Assistance in placing ads (on association website, in its journals,    .)  33.8 
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As was true for the dissemination of information on new technologies, associations’ role 
in organizing and publicizing trade fairs and exhibits would appear to be of some importance to 
the exchange of goods and services. Indeed, associations seem to consider these services among 
the most critical that they offer to their members (see Table 8). Firms, moreover, confirm their 
value. As we can observe in Table 9, of those members that have directly received marketing-
related  services  from  associations,  nearly  one-half  (44.1%)  had  received  information  from 
associations on trade fairs and exhibits and a similar percentage (39.7%) benefited directly from 
their assistance in organizing them. As we can observe in Table 10, large percentages of non-
members participate as well in these events. Although association members report relying more 
heavily  upon  them  to  find  new  customers,  relatively  equal  numbers  of  members  and  non-
members use them to find new suppliers. 
In addition to their trade fairs, which act as a hub bringing together buyers and sellers 
often from distant locales, associations facilitate firms’ search for new trade partners by directly 
disseminating information on specific actors and general market conditions. Roughly half of 
associations,  for  instance,  report  providing  services  related  to  “market  research”  and,  more 
specifically, to production, pricing and demand conditions in output markets.  Roughly half of 
associations,  as  well,  offer  direct  assistance  in  the  search  for  new  clients,  both  foreign  and 
domestic.  Table  9  demonstrates  that  non-trivial  numbers  of  firms  are  consumers  of  these 
services. And Table 10 shows that roughly 10% of all firms identify new customers and suppliers 
with information directly received from business associations.  
Table 10. Which of the following mechanisms do you use  
for finding new customers and suppliers? 
  Customers    Suppliers   
  Non-members  Members    Non-members  Members   
Participation in trade fairs and exhibitions  44.5  57.6  **  47.2  51.5   
Advertisements  58.0  60.6    54.7  53.2   
Business associations  7.4  12.8  *  9.0  12.9   
Support of ministries and other 
governmental bodies  12.3  8.4    8.3  7.1   
Participation in tenders and competitions   37.5  37.3    27.5  26.8   
Approaching prospective trade partners 
directly  64.8  65.3    73.8  67.3     30 
Approaching personnel of other enterprises 
that may have information  49.2  47.8    58.5  49.6  * 
Conducting market research  45.5  50.7    33.0  41.5  * 
** Difference significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level. Firms were asked to rank on a scale of 1-5 the 
importance of the various mechanisms (with 5 representing “extremely important”); a response was considered 
positive if the respondent ranked it as “4” or higher. 
 
Table 11. To whom do you turn (if anybody) to receive information on the 
reliability/reputation of potential customers and suppliers? 
  Customers    Suppliers   
  Non-members  Members    Non-members  Members   
Directly to personnel of other enterprises 
that may have information  70.4  68.1    77.3  77.9   
Business associations  2.7  18.5  **  3.7  20.2  ** 
Private marketing/consulting firms  12.7  12.1    12.0  12.8   
Banks  17.9  27.0  *  11.3  17.4  * 
Government officials  24.4  27.4    21.0  20.2   
Other  12.0  13.3    9.3  11.6   
** Difference significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.  
 
In addition, some of the information services that associations provide are designed to 
mitigate problems of identifying both the quality of goods and the reliability of prospective trade 
partners. As we see in Table 8, a number of associations try to address potential customers’ 
difficulties with verifying the quality of goods and services by providing informal consulting 
services or more formal certification services. In an interview with the author, an official at the 
Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  of  the  Russian  Federation  described  these  certification 
services as the most important provided by the network of Chambers throughout the country.  
Over  half  of  the  associations  reported  providing  information  on  the  reliability  of 
prospective trade partners. As we can see in Table 11, these services are either made available to 
or accessed by association members to a much greater  extent than non-members.
39 Whereas 
members  and  non-members  both  use  business  associations  to  identify  new  customers  in 
relatively large numbers, only the former seem to have access to associations for information 
                                                           
39 A relatively large number of respondents noted turning to parties other than those listed.  Roughly half of 
these responses were either a variant of “our own protection service” or “we have our ways.”    31 
about trade partners’ prospective reliability. This finding is at least suggestive that this sort of 
information  may  be  used  as  a  “selective  incentive”  to  motivate  members’  support  of  other 
services.  
In  resolving  problems  of  identifying  both  the  identities  and  potential  reliability  of 
potential trade partners, we observe that firms also rely upon other third parties as informational 
intermediaries. In this respect, we observe that members of business associations are a bit more 
likely to rely upon banks to help assess potential partners’ reliability. This finding is consistent 
with evidence presented earlier that association members have privileged access to banks for 
financing,  possibly  because  banks  are  often,  themselves,  members  of  associations.  We  also 
observe in Table 11 that although a number of firms continue to rely upon government officials 
to mitigate information problems in markets, members and non-members do not appear to differ 
with respect to access to them.  
Enterprise Performance 
So far we have only considered the relationship between business associations’ services 
and enterprise behavior without addressing whether or not those services, which are supplied 
disproportionately  to  members,  have  a  disproportionate  impact  on  members’  performance. 
Although it is possible that the investment and knowledge dissemination that associations have 
promoted over the three year period may not appear in contemporaneous performance data, we 
nevertheless think it useful to call attention to the survey’s rather blunt measures of economic 
success.  Of  association  members,  72.0%  and  71.5%  report  an  increase  in  output  and  sales, 
respectively, over the previous three years, compared to only 57.8% and 63.0% among non-
members.  And  whereas  25.9%  of  association  members  note  a  significant  improvement  in 
economic performance over the same period, only 18.2% of non-members did.
40 When these 
three  measures  of  performance  are  included  as  dependent  variables  in  the  same  models 
considered earlier, Table 12 shows that association membership is positively and significantly 
associated  only  with  output  growth.  Although  the  coefficient  on  the  association  dummy  is 
positive  in  the  case  of  sales  and  financial  improvement,  the  results  are  not  statistically 
significant.    32 
Several points should be made about these results and how they compare with those 
presented in Table 3. The behaviors that our evidence suggests are promoted by association 
membership generally relate to investments that may only bring a return with the passage of 
time. A firm that has recently introduced a new production technology, which it learned about at 
an association-sponsored trade fair, may, for instance, wait several  years before sales and/or 
profitability are affected. So the stronger relationship of membership with an investment strategy 
than with enhanced performance over the same period is not necessarily surprising. But even to 
the extent we do observe a statistically significant and positive relationship between business 
association membership and output, we should be cautious in the interpretation. By itself, of 
course, it is not evidence of a causal relationship, merely a positive association. However, given 
the evidence that associations do provide services that may allow members to expand faster than 
others,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  the  performance-related  impact  of  joining  the 
association is not entirely trivial in comparison to other factors (some of which we may not 
observe)  that  might  feed  into  both  the  decision  to  join  an  association  and  the  enterprise’s 
performance.  
Table 12. Performance during previous three years 
         
  Output grew   Sales grew  Financial 
performance greatly 
improved 
       
Member of business association  0.105**  0.052  0.060 
  (2.37)  (1.15)  (1.61) 
0.123**  0.106**  0.158***  Members of commercial group (    , 
FIG, holding, etc.)  (2.31)  (1.98)  (3.41) 
De novo enterprise  0.023  0.049  0.073* 
  (0.46)  (0.98)  (1.71) 
Log employees (2001)  -0.005  0.008  0.023 
  (0.30)  (0.44)  (1.60) 
Capital utilization rate (2001)  0.000  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.08)  (0.07)  (1.05) 
-0.025  -0.012  -0.033**  Level  of  competition  (index  of 
average over period)  (1.22)  (0.56)  (2.04) 
Age of director  -0.004**  -0.007***  -0.007*** 
  (2.27)  (3.35)  (3.72) 
       
                                                                                                                                                                                           
40 All reported differences were significant at at least the 5% level. Managers were asked to assess their 
financial performance over the previous three years on a 1-5 scale, with a response of 5 representing a 
significant improvement.   33 
Ownership controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Prob > chi2  0.0035  0.0078  0.0000 
Number of observations  528  526  532 
Pseudo R-square  .0704  .0677  .1388 
 
Perhaps  most  importantly,  however,  the  weaker  relationship  of  membership  to 
performance measures (as opposed to behavioral strategies) does not undermine the main point 
that  the  Olsonian  perspective  on  collective  action  in  the  business  community  is  misplaced. 
Whether businesses organize more to redistribute rents or more to alleviate market failures, their 
ultimate  objective  (i.e.,  their  maximand)  does  not  necessarily  differ.    What  would  differ, 
however, would be the strategies employed in achieving that objective. So, if Olson’s perspective 
is  inadequate  and  collective  action  in  the  post-communist  business  community  has  socially 
beneficial purposes, we might expect to see the effects of association membership reflected more 
strongly in firms’ actions than in their performance. 
Discussion 
  Earlier, we suggested that organizations for collective action in the business community 
could  be  thought  of  as  residing  somewhere  in  a  two-dimensional  space  in  which  one  axis 
measures the resources they devote to the redistribution of rents, while the other measures the 
resources they devote to the generation of new wealth. To this strategy space, we could even add 
a third dimension measuring the organization’s impact on social welfare. If our desire effectively 
is to situate the community of business associations within this space, we should clarify that our 
interest is in accounting for their effect at the margin. That is, relative to a world in which 
businesses may still communicate and cooperate, we would ultimately like to asses how much 
the  formal  organization  adds  to  the  resources  devoted  to  these  two  ends  and  how  this 
subsequently alters social welfare. After all, some of what associations do may merely subsume 
activities that would have occurred otherwise, but more informally.
41 Ultimately, as well, we 
would like to address the factors that determine the coordinates of individual associations within 
this  three-dimensional  associational  space.  There  may,  after  all,  be  reasons  for  policy  to 
                                                           
41  This  point  recalls  Smith’s  admonition  that  though  collusion  may  occur  in  the  absence  of  formal 
organization, public policy should never facilitate that sort of inter-firm communication by making it easier to 
organize.   34 
facilitate (or inhibit) the organization of some interests, but not others. At this time, however, we 
are aware of no research that rigorously addresses this net impact of association activity, either in 
the post-communist context or anywhere else. And indeed here in this article, our objectives have 
been  more  modest.  Nevertheless,  by  exploiting  a  unique  research  design,  which  made  both 
associations and firms the units of analysis in separate survey instruments, we addressed what we 
feel are two misconceptions about where and/or why the organized business community may be 
located in a particular region of this associational space.  
The  first  misconception  –  that  post-communist  business  associations  are  weak  and 
ineffective – has been both implicit in the lack of attention that they have received in the social 
science literature on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and explicit in most of those 
analyses that have addressed their impact there. One of the most convincing pieces of evidence 
that this is not the case in Russia is that a large number of firms have voluntarily joined their 
ranks, with the rate of inflow appearing to have increased in recent years. Many, moreover, 
report receiving services (some of which are highlighted in this article), which seem to have at 
least some impact on their behavior. In short, their survey responses make explicit and their 
willingness to absorb dues, fees and voluntary contributions implies that they have generally 
benefited from the association with an association.  
The precise nature of that benefit goes to the heart of the second misconception. Mancur 
Olson’s vision of associations as organizations that provide value to their members primarily 
through redistribution instead of wealth generation does not fare well in the face of the evidence 
from Russia. The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982) clearly points to the conclusion that the 
marginal  impact  of  formalized  collective  action  in  the  business  community  is  negative.  He 
argues that they are hostile to free trade; he concludes that they inhibit the introduction and 
dissemination of new technologies; and by investing resources in lobbying and, potentially, the 
organization  of  cartels,  he  implies  that,  ceteris  paribus,  they  devote  fewer  resources  to 
investments in human and physical capital. Power and Prosperity (2000) then argues that the 
analysis holds particular relevance for the post-Soviet world. We find, however, that judged on 
the  basis  their  memberships’  actions,  the  associations  that  have  emerged  in  Russia  do  not 
resemble what Olson envisioned. Their members expand their trade contacts and invest in new 
technologies, capital upgrades and worker training at rates that exceed those of non-members.  
As was explained, this finding may either be a function of some unobserved feature(s) of the   35 
firms themselves or of the direct impact of membership. Although survey evidence suggests that 
there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  to  at  least  some  degree  the  latter  is  positively  and 
meaningfully  affecting  this  conclusion,  our  questioning  of  the  relevance  of  the  Olsonian 
framework is not contingent on this being the case.  Even if the differences in behavior between 
members and non-members are not the direct result of the business organizations’ activities, it is 
not  clear  why  firms  that  are  more  interested  in  pursuing  these  apparently  market-adapting 
strategies would join organizations that are fundamentally hostile to them. 
By way of conclusion, at least two important caveats are in order. First, it is possible and 
perhaps even probable that our findings are sensitive to the conditions prevailing in the period 
prior  to  the  survey.  The  past  half-decade  in  Russia  has  been  characterized  by  stability  and 
growth, much unlike the first seven or eight  years of the post-communist era. One can well 
imagine how this may have tipped the balance from a world in which the returns from collective 
action  to  support  rent  seeking  declined  relative  to  those  to  support  restructuring  and  market 
building.  Stability and growth, after all, lengthen effective time horizons and should increase the 
expected  gains  from  engaging  in  market-adapting  behavior  and  financing  market-supporting 
institutions. 
Second, it should be clear by now that this article did not directly address the rent seeking 
services offered by associations. Lobbying and collusion tend to be less transparent, making it 
more difficult to assess their impact than the behaviors that were the focus here. So even though 
some  of  our  evidence  suggests  that  association  members  neither  face  less  competition  nor 
capture government officials to a greater extent than non-members, we cannot locate with any 
precision Russian business associations within our associational space. The fact that associations 
engage in a number of activities that would appear to be net welfare enhancing does not preclude 
that they may also be involved in others whose social impact is less benign.  
These caveats both suggest directions for future research and clarify the article’s ultimate 
message: survey responses from firms and associations alike suggest that business associations 
have become economic actors of consequence in post-communist Russia; in no small part, this is 
because they offer services broadly supportive of economic restructuring.     36 
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